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Generally, commodity prices immediately after harvest tend to be low because of supply 
glut and rise over time away from harvest as supply shrinks and demand remains virtually 
unchanged.  Unfortunately, because many Malawian farmers do not have effective 
storage, they do not have any commodity for sale when prices are high. To help improve 
the income Malawian farmers may generate from their activities, this thesis explored the 
feasibility of hybridizing the two forms of price risk management systems in Malawi to 
minimize their individual weaknesses and enhance their collective benefits. The two risk 
management systems are forward contracts and warehouse receipt systems. 
Forward contracts allow farmers and their buyers to agree on a future delivery date and 
commodity price. On the agreed date, the farmer delivers the commodity and receives the 
agreed price. It allows farmers to pass downward price risk to buyers and guarantees a 
fixed price. As private transactions, forward contracts are not regulated by the 
Government, and present opportunism and enforcement challenges. Warehouse Receipt 
System (WRS) enables farmers to deposit their crop in the care of a warehouse operator 
and sell the crop when and where they choose. Farmers, therefore, incur both upside and 
downside price movement but avoid some of the opportunism and enforcement 
challenges presented by forward contracts.   
The thesis explored the net benefits of developing a hybrid system that allow forward 
contracts with warehouse receipt enforcement mechanisms. Thus, farmers are guaranteed a 
minimum price at some future date and the deposited commodity is used as the security 
supporting the guaranteed minimum price. The buyer also deposits a performance bond as 
 
 
commitment to purchase the commodity. The costs associated with these transactions are 
real and could affect participation. The thesis provides a process for assessing these 
transaction costs and incorporating them into the effectiveness of forward contracts, 
warehouse receipt systems and the hybrid program. The mathematical model example has 
proved that the hybrid system guarantees a fixed margin to the farmer over and above the 
harvest price and WRS cost as opposed to fluctuating margins under WRS alone.  
The thesis has identified three factors that can lead to the successful implementation of this 
hybrid system in Malawi  and they include: the availability of the warehouse receipt bill, 
reliable warehouse certification which is done by AHCX and ACE on third party 
warehouse operators; and the availability of performance guarantee assuring that the 
quantities and quality of goods match those specified by the warehouse receipt. The thesis 
has also identified two factors that could hinder  a successful implementation of this hybrid 
program and they include: first, low scale of warehousing operations under WRS which 
could deny most farmers a chance to access and benefit from this hybrid sytem and the 
commodity exchanges may not benefit from the economies of scale provided by large 
volumes of commodities produced in rural areas. Second, the absence of a harmonized 
national grading standard which possess a challenge when engaging in international trade. 
Finally, the thesis has made three recommendations for the successful implementation of 
the hybrid program as follows:  Taking the system close to the producers to mitigate 
potentially high transportation costs; educating and selling the system to the stakeholders to 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
 
Maybe because of weather or in spite of it, Malawian farmers have to content with 
significant vicissitudes in commodity prices.  Generally, commodity prices immediately 
after harvest tend to be low because of supply glut. These prices rise over time away from 
harvest as supply shrinks and demand remains unchanged.  Unfortunately, because many 
Malawian farmers do not have effective storage, they do not have any commodity for sale 
when prices are high. This status ensures the perpetual income deficits facing many 
Malawian farmers.  
Although price risk management may be undertaken through several strategies, Malawian 
farmers have used forward contracts as well as warehouse receipt system as price risk 
management strategies. Forward contracts as a risk management strategy allows a farmer 
and a buyer to agree on a future price for a commodity. On the agreed date, the farmer 
delivers the commodity at the agreed price. It allows a farmer to pass the price risk to the 
buyer who is, technically, under contract to purchase the product at the contracted price. 
Because forward contracts are private transactions and are not regulated by the 
Government, they exhibit significant contract enforcement risks. For example, when 
prices increase above the contracted price, farmers may sell to others instead of fulfilling 
their contractual obligations. On the contrary, when prices fall, buyers’ incentive to 
renege on the contract increases. Thus, as currently operated in Malawi, forward 
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contracts are ineffective price risk management strategies for both farmers and their 
buyers.  
In an environment where formal contract enforcement mechanisms are a challenge, 
Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) may offer a solution. First, WRS enables farmers to 
bulk their crop for deposit, ensuring compliance with quality and minimum quantity 
standards. The quality and quantity of the tradeable stored commodity assured, implying 
sellers can sell to any number of buyers at a time of their choosing. Furthermore, the 
guarantee of delivery by warehouse operators reduces counterparty risk, that is, the risk 
of non-performance of trade contracts. Apart from contractual issues, WRS allows 
farmers to delay sales of recently-harvested crops by providing them with credit, storage 
space and market information until the market has stabilized and prices have increased 
(G. Onumah 2010). However, WRS incurs storage cost, quality certification and trading 
commission; but it doesn’t guarantee the exact forward price considering that future 
prices may vary depending on forces of demand and supply. 
The foregoing indicates that forwards contracts and warehouse receipt system 
complement each other in addressing the uncertainty peculiar to each risk management 
tool. WRS provides a guarantee on the availability of the commodity with quality and 
quantity assured which is a challenge under forward contract. On the other hand, WRS 
does not guarantee the exact forward price which forward contracts provide. 
Understanding the effect of costs on the WRS performance vis-à-vis the uncertainty 
associated with forward contracts could provide some insights into the economic viability 
in Malawi as a hybrid risk management tool.  
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Effective price risk management tools for Malawian farmers remain a critical problem 
adversely affecting their incomes. Identifying effective tools for specific conditions could 
help alleviate some of the financial challenges farmers face. This is the problem tackled 
by this research.   
 
1.2  Research Question  
 
The question this research seeks to answer is this: What are the economic costs and 
benefits of hybridizing forward contracts and WRS in Malawi and does this hybrid risk 
management tool offer a superior net benefit than either price risk management tools on 
their own for Malawian farmers?  
1.3  Research Objectives 
 
The overall objective of this research is to assess the economics of WRS and forward 
contracts in the agricultural commodity sector of Malawi and develop a hybrid price risk 
management system utilizing both alternatives.  The specific objectives are as follows: 
1. Describe the conceptual frameworks supporting warehouse receipt system and 
forward contracting and identify the governance mechanisms that influence their 
effective operations in a marketplace. 
2. Place the conceptual frameworks and the related governance mechanisms 
described above within the context and institutional realities of the Malawian 
agricultural economy with the view to understanding the effect of institutions to 
the effective operations of these risk management tools 
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3. Simulate the outcomes of the two alternative risk management tools under known 
Malawian governance and institutional conditions to determine their transaction 
costs and benefits for farmers and buyers under alternative conditions. 
4. Determine the effectiveness of hybridizing the two risk management tools by 




CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Commodity Price Risk 
 
Over the last two decades, commodity prices in Malawi have been more volatile than 
those of manufactured goods. Commodity price uncertainty, whether caused by 
government policy, foreign exchange rates, climatic disasters, or political/civil instability, 
is inherent in commodity markets. 
 
Price volatility leaves farmers uncertain about the price they could receive at the time of 
sale. The problem is, however, not limited to how much cash farmers receive for their 
commodities at harvest. Every investment decision made during the crop cycle is a 
difficult one because of the price uncertainty. For example, it is difficult to determine 
how much to borrow and the cost of the loan since ability to repay is determined by 
commodity prices, assuming yields are not compromised. Uncertain prices pressure 
borrowers’ ability to repay and thus make agriculture financing a risky proposition for 
lenders. On the other hand, financial institutions and potential creditors are reluctant to 
lend to farmers and commodity traders knowing the price uncertainties confronting them.  
Often, they will raise interest rates to cover these price risks, but they mostly refuse to 
provide credit. As a result, it is not surprising that a lack of price risk management is one 
of the major reasons that poor farmers stay poor (World Business Council for Sustanable 




This section reviews some of the literature on market based agricultural risk management 
tools which includes forward contracts and warehouse receipt system. The chapter is 
divided into six parts The first part discusses the literature on forward contracts, looking 
at their nature, effectiveness and weaknesses.  The second part discusses transaction costs 
in contracts and how they affect decision making. The third part discusses Market 
Supporting Institutions (MSI) and how they help in reducing transactions costs and 
enforce contracts. The fourth part discusses Warehouse Receipt system, looking at the 
benefits, key players and key requirements for a succeful WRS. The fifth part part 
discusses Warehouse Receipt System in Malawi, looking at the the key players, the WRS 
process and the legal framework supporting WRS. The sixth part discusses empirical 
studies on the role of transaction costs in small scale farmers marketing and 
impacts of Commodity Exchanges as MSIs. 
 
2.2 Forward Contracts 
 
According to Kang and Manajan (2006), forward contract is an agreement between the 
seller and the buyer to deliver a specified quantity of a commodity to the buyer in the 
future for a specified price or in accordance with a specific pricing formula. The terms 
and conditions of the forward contract are therefore usually specific to each transaction. 
They categorize forward contracts into the following types: 
(i) Fixed price contract: A fixed price (or flat price) contract is one of the most common 
types of forward contracts. In a fixed-price forward contract, the farmer commits 
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himself to delivering at an agreed time a certain quantity of commodities of a specified 
quality. Normally, the farmer is only paid on delivery, although this type of contract 
can also be used to obtain pre-harvest financing. Premiums and discounts may be 
established for the produce that does not meet specified quality standards. The farmer 
carries the opportunity risk of losing potential gains when market prices rise. 
 
(ii) Price-to-be-fixed contract: Price-to-be-fixed (PTBF) contracts, also called 
executable orders (in sugar trade) or on call contracts (in cotton trade), are the most 
common form of export contracts for commodities from Latin America. They are also 
very common in Asia, and although still common in Africa, are relatively less used. 
Unlike other forward contracts where the used reference prices are commonly futures 
market prices, in this case the seller (or the buyer, in case of processors, importers or 
end-users) has the active ability to fix the prices at the moment deemed most 
opportune. 
 
(iii) Deferred pricing contract: A deferred pricing (or delayed pricing, price later, no 
price established) contract provides that the farmer delivers the commodity and 
transfers ownership on the contract date but maintains control over when it is priced. 
This contract allows the seller to separate the pricing decision from the delivery 
decision. The risks of storage are passed to the buyer at the time of delivery and the 
contract may also be used as a substitute for storage when unavailable. The price may 
equal the elevator’s bid price or an adjusted futures price at a time selected by the 
farmer. While this gives the farmer the opportunity to benefit from price rises, he also 
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retains the risk that prices will fall between the time the contract is entered and the 
date on which the sales price is determined. This is one of the most widely used 
instruments for small scale farmers, especially where there is an established level of 
confidence in the buyer. 
 
(iv) Deferred payment contract: A deferred (or delayed) payment contract specifies the 
price to be paid and transfers ownership upon delivery while postponing payment. 
This contract may also offer farmers tax advantages by deferring income from the 
sale of a commodity to the next tax year as a tax-saving strategy for the current year. 
 
(v) Minimum price contract: This forward contract is similar to a fixed-price forward 
contract, except that it guarantees a minimum price with an opportunity to participate 
in future price gains. From the farmer’s side, this eliminates an important risk factor, 
and the incentive to default on the contract is less than that with fixed-price contracts. 
On the other hand, the buyer (elevator or packer) can also hedge the assumed risks by 
taking opposite positions. The farmer can be required to pay a certain price to take 
advantage of this benefit. In practice, the vast majority of farmers in developing 
countries have no access to forward contracts that contain this kind of price risk 
management component. 
 
(vi) Reference price forward contract: This form of forward contract uses reference 
prices, at times futures prices, but more often average export prices of a country, to 
price forward contracts. On delivery, farmers are automatically paid the price of the 
9 
 
day or period when they make their delivery. This type of arrangement is quite 
common in contract farming and out grower/nucleus estate systems. It is also the basis 
for the standard pricing formula for most developing country sugar producers, who 
receive a fixed percentage of the sales prices of their sugar. 
 
There are three essential concepts in using forward contracts. First, given that no cash 
transfer occurs when the contract is signed, the seller of the commodity is obliged to 
deliver the commodity at maturity; however, the buyer does not have to pay money up 
front (except for transaction fees). Second, since the sole guarantee that a forward 
contract will be honored is the reputation of the two parties entering the agreement, 
there is an inherent credit or default risk: the counterpart of the forward transaction 
may fail either to deliver the commodity or to pay the agreed price at maturity  Third, 
forward contracts are primarily merchandising vehicles, whereby both parties expect 
to make or take delivery of the commodity on the agreed upon date (UNCTAD 1998). 
 
2.3 Transaction costs in contracts 
 
2.3.1 Theoretical overview 
 
The general hypothesis of the Transaction Cost Economics paradigm is that institutions 
are transaction cost-minimizing arrangements, which may change and evolve with 
changes in the nature and sources of transaction costs. This work was pioneered by 
Coase. In his seminal article “The Nature of the Firm” (Course 1937) he argued that 
market exchange is not without costs. He recognized the role of transaction costs in the 
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organization of firms and other contracts. Transaction costs include the costs of 
information, negotiation, monitoring, co-ordination and enforcement of contracts. He 
explains that firms emerge to economize on the transaction costs of market exchange and 
that the “boundary” of a firm or the extent of vertical integration will depend on the 
magnitude of the transaction costs.  
 
The work of Williamson (1979, 1993, 1996) on the economics of organization and 
contracts follows on from Coase’s line of thinking. According to Williamson, transaction 
cost theory is based on three behavioral assumptions: bounded rationality, opportunism, 
and risk neutrality. This implies that a transaction is associated with contractual risks, for 
example the opportunistic behavior of one of the contracting parties, or the so called 
hold-up problem that comes up if one contracting party tries to exploit the other party’s 
vulnerability connected to his asset specific investments” (Royer 1999). Asset specificity 
is important in transaction cost theory (Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism 1985) because rising asymmetric  specific asset investments make markets 
less competitive by reducing the number of potential trading partners, locking one partner 
to the other and offering increasing incentives for renegotiation.  
 
As economic incentives to behave opportunistically rise, the preferences of the 
contracting parties diverge: while the exchanging firms have an incentive to jointly 
maximize long-term profits, each also wishes to maximize its return in the short term by 
appropriating as much of the gains as possible whenever contractual changes are required 
(Williamson, The Governance of contractual Relations 1979). The condition of diverging 
preferences is known as goal incongruence, or a lack of overlapping goals (Ouchi 1980). 
11 
 
Cooperation is difficult to achieve in conditions of goal incongruence because the 
individuals involved each follow their own differing objectives (Mahoney and McNally 
2004). The conceptualization of transaction costs theory assumes goal incongruence is 
given, although some transaction costs theorists acknowledge that incentive alignment or 
loyalty may reduce goal incongruence (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Organization 
theorists, on the other hand, place particular emphasis on the ability to reduce goal 
incongruence through means other than incentives because doing so may increase 
exchange efficiency (Ouchi 1980). Organization theory adds cultural control as a 
mechanism to reduce goal incongruence. Cultural control focuses on aligning the views 
of governance structure members through organization culture, which is a fairly stable set 
of assumptions, beliefs, meanings, and values that individuals use to orient their thinking 
and to guide their actions (Scott 1998).  
 
Transaction costs are classified into observable and unobservable or inhibitive transaction 
costs (Staal, Delgado and Nicholson 1997). The observable transaction costs include 
marketing costs such as transport, handling, packaging, storage, spoilage etc. (Delgado 
1995) and are observable when a transaction takes place. The unobservable transaction 
costs include cost of information search, bargaining, screening, monitoring, co-
ordination, enforcement and product differentiation (Bardhan 1984). The latter are 
inhibitive and often cannot be observed.  
 
 Transaction costs theory shows that transaction cost problems can be dealt with using the 
different forms of governance structures. Organizational theory forms the basis for the 
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concepts underlying the different governance structures. In trying to deal with transaction 
costs we cannot run away from organizational theories. In Williamson’s framework, a 
trade-off has to be made between the costs of coordination and hierarchy within an 
organization, and the costs of transacting and forming contracts in the market 
(Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1985). This trade-off will depend 








2.3.2 Search and switching cost and the default option 
 
This section explores the literature that explains factors that drives parties in the forward 
contracts to renege. The literature is adopted from the search and switching cost in a 
consumer-seller relationship and can be related to contracted parties.  
  
Consumers’ ability to change suppliers is often restricted by both the costs of collecting 
information about alternative options and the costs of organizing or adjusting to an actual 
changeover (Wilson 2012).  
 
Farrel and Kemperer (2007) suggest “a consumer faces a switching cost between sellers 
when an investment specific to his current seller must be duplicated for a new seller”. 
Unlike switching costs, search costs cannot be incurred by a fully informed consumer 
(Distinction 1), search costs may be incurred more than once by searching across multiple 
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firms (Distinction 2), and search costs may be incurred without then necessarily choosing 
to switch suppliers (Distinction 3). 
 
Switching costs may deter initial search activity but they do not affect the extensiveness 
of any search because they cannot be incurred across multiple firms (Distinction 2). 
However, because switching costs can still be incurred by fully informed consumers, 
(Distinction 1), they also enhance the loyalty of consumers that have searched the entire 
market. (Wilson 2012) suggests that search costs have more powerful effect on market 
power. This follows from Distinction 3 which ensures that search costs have the stronger 
effect in deterring initial search activity. When evaluating whether to start searching, 
consumers place less weight on switching costs because, unlike search costs, they are 
incurred only with the probability of finding an attractive alternative.  
 
Within this context, this thesis looks at transaction costs (including search costs) for 
farmers entering into a forward contract under alternative scenarios; and transaction cost 
for contracted parties in forward contract to reneging on a contract. 
 
2.4 Market-supporting institutions 
 
Markets only function in the presence of an adequate institutional environment. The 
Institutional environment involves formal and informal rules that private trading partners 
have to comply with and that constrain but also facilitate exchange relationships. Market-
supporting institutions ensure that contracts are enforced, property rights are respected, 
opportunistic behavior by trading partners is diminished, the adverse effects of 
externalities are reduced, information flows improve, transaction costs are reduced, and 
14 
 
tools for risk management are provided ( (Grief 2008); (McMillan, Market Institutions 
2008); (World Bank 2012)). 
 
Without such market-supporting institutions, coordination of exchange in the market will 
incur substantial transaction costs as exchange partners have to safeguard themselves 
against opportunistic behavior and spend time and effort in finding suitable trading 
partners, negotiating the terms of exchange, overcoming information asymmetries, 
monitoring and enforcing agreements. Several studies have shown the importance of 
personal networks in coordinating exchange relationships in the absence of market-
supporting institutions, such as an inadequate legal framework to enforce contractual 
agreements; or the role of trade credit to overcome the absence of formal financial market 
institutions ( (Fafchamps and Minten 2002); (McMillan and Woodruff 1999)). As a 
result, the absence of proper market-supporting institutions leads to limited opportunities 
for growth: insecure property rights reduce incentives to invest and at the same time 
reduce opportunities for investment as property cannot be leveraged as collateral; the 
dependence of exchange relations on close, personal networks limits opportunities to 
benefit from innovations outside the network and limits the opportunities for growth in 
sales volume. 
 
Grief (2018) discusses the establishment of market-supporting institutions (MSI) for 
contract enforcement. He claims that although contract- enforcing institutions exist in 
many forms, their effectiveness depends largely on the extent to which they succeed in 
making the threat of sanctions (or rewards) credible. If no credible threat is established 
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that a breach of the agreement will be punished, then contracting parties will not credibly 
commit to adhere to their contractual obligations. He distinguishes between ‘organically’ 
(spontaneously) formed MSI and purposefully ‘designed’ MSI. This holds similarity to 
(Aoki 2007) who distinguishes between the exogenous view on institutions (designed 
MSI) and the endogenous view (organic MSI). Exogenous economic institutions such as 
contracts are regarded as “rational transaction-cost-saving responses” that are established 
within the constraints of the institutional environment that is formed by regulatory rules 
and social norms. Endogenous economic institutions are “shaped and sustained in the 
repeated operational plays of the game itself” (Aoki 2007). 
 
In organic MSI, the credible threat by the economic agents to impose sanctions deters 
breach of contract. Such organic market-supporting contract enforcement institutions are 
most likely to occur in cases where agents value the prospect of continued exchange. The 
enforcement device in such situations is often based on reputation effects. The potentially 
negative effect on an agent’s reputation deters contract breach. Such reputation-based 
deterrence for contract breach is stronger in multilateral reputation mechanisms than in 
bilateral relationships as behavior can be monitored more easily, more information can be 
shared, and sanctions are generally higher. Organic MSI for contract enforcement are 
most likely to emerge in situations where “parties are locked into their relationships, 
markets are thin, and it is costly to find a new exchange partner” (Grief 2008). 
 
Designed MSI for contract enforcement are intentionally created organizations that are 
based on more formalized rules. These rules and organizations “increase the disciplinary 
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impact of economic sanctions by changing the information structure, providing 
coordination and by altering the strategic interaction among economic agents” (Grief 
2008). For example, the creation of an organization for interaction among actors, changes 
infrequent interactions of one actor with any other actor into frequent interactions 
between actors and the organization. Membership of the organization holds certain value 
to its members e.g., because of the possibilities to attract more trade, or by lowering 
transaction costs as the organization credibly disciplines members to adhere to their 
obligations. This value of membership, on the other hand, also means that the sanctioning 
device that the organization can employ is the threat of exclusion in the case that the 
organizational rules are broken. 
 
The initial set-up costs of the organization in case of the designed MSI for contract 
enforcement are high: acquisition of organizational capital, making common rules, 
generating awareness about the existence and credibility of the organization. However, 
“once established, designed MSI exhibit low marginal costs of expanding the number of 
members / individuals / transactions covered by the institution” (Grief 2008). 
2.5 Warehouse Receipt System 
 
2.5.1 Overview of Warehouse Receipt System 
 
Most smallholder farmers need cash immediately after harvest to prepare for the next 
crop. This necessitates immediate sale of the new crop since the situation of nearly every 
farmer is the same. The new crop floods the local market shortly after harvest dropping 
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the price. As the result, most smallholder farmers have no choice but to sell into the 
poorest market (WIC Project 2005). 
 
The use of a warehouse receipt allows a farmer to deposit his crop in a warehouse and to 
meet his short term need for cash by borrowing from a bank or other lending institution. 
This allows the farmer to avoid selling his crop immediately at harvest when the supply 
of the commodity is usually highest and therefore prices lowest (WIC Project 2005). 
 
2.5.2 Meaning of WRS 
 
Warehouse receipts (WR) are documents issued by warehouse operators as evidence that 
depositors have deposited specified commodities of stated quantity and quality, at 
particular location by named depositor (Coulter and Onumah 2002). 
 
The receipt is issued to the owner as evidence of location and ownership. A significant 
characteristic of a WR is the security it provides a buyer. When a WR is offered for sale, 
the buyer knows that the underlying commodity is in secure storage, being managed 
professionally. The buyer knows that he will get the quantity and quality stated on the 
WR and that it is guaranteed by the storage facility operator. The storage operator is 
liable in case of a default and the WRS requires that the storage facilities are 
comprehensively insured: the WR owner has to take out on-site insurance, not only for 




The receipt is also a negotiable instrument that can be sold or used as collateral for a loan, 
backed by the claim to the commodity held in the warehouse” (World Bank 2012). This is 
also beneficial to the banks as they are able to reach a new set of customers for financial 
services and products. 
 
2.5.3 Key players of WRS and their roles 
 
The WRS has three main players, which are the depositor, warehouse operator and the 
finance institution (Kwadjo 2000). In order for these players to work properly, the 
Government must make sure that the working environment is of good quality by 
preparing good policies and other regulations. The depositor may be a producer, farmer 
group, trader, exporter, processor or indeed any individual or body corporate. The 
warehouse operator holds the stored commodity by way of safe custody; implying he is 
legally liable to make good any value lost through theft or damage by fire and other 
catastrophes but has no legal or beneficial interest in it (G. Onumah 2002). The receipts 
may be transferable, allowing transfer to a new holder - a lender (where the stored 
commodity is pledged as security for a loan) or trade counter-party - which entitles the 
holder to take delivery of the commodity upon presentation of the WR at the warehouse. 
 




          Figure 2.1:  How warehouse receipt system works 
 
     Source: (Saint-Geours 2012) 
 
2.5.4 Benefits of WRS 
 
According to Bass and Henderson (2000) and Onumah (2002), the benefits from WRS can 
be explained into two sides, for the Financial Institutions (FIs) and for depositors (Farmers 
and traders).  
For the FIs, the benefits are: 
 Decreased risk;  
 Reduced seasonal price variability and 
  Higher level of liquidity 
For the depositors the benefits include:  
 Improved farm income and smooth domestic prices 
 Can create cash and forward markets and hence price discovery and competition 
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  It offers stable prices and linking the small farm sector to guaranteed and 
profitable markets for produce.  
 WRS forces industry to improve on the storage opportunities and thereby reduces 
postharvest losses.  
 If offers small farmers the opportunity to bulk their crops, grade and store them 
which in turn means they could be offered to a wider geographical area and trade 
“unseen” based on the WR.  
 A WRS guarantees delivery thereby reducing counterparty risk.  
 A WRS goes hand in hand with the supply of market information.  
 It greatly improves the integrity of the system since all products are now 
inspected and graded.  
 
2.5.5 Key requirements to ensure a successful WRS 
 
According to Bass and Henderson (2000), implementing a successful warehouse receipt 
program can be done easily if a few key factors are in place. These are lessons learned from 
the experience in Ghana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and other African countries and can be 
grouped into two: 
a) Appropriate regulation and supervision of the sector: 
In order for a WRS to be viable, the economy within which it operates must meet certain 
conditions: The legal system must support pledge instruments, such as warehouse receipts, 
as secure collateral. The pertinent legislation must meet several conditions: 
i. Warehouse receipts must be functionally equivalent to stored commodities; 
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ii. The rights, liabilities, and duties of each party to a warehouse receipt (for example a 
farmer, a bank, or a warehouseman) must be clearly defined; 
iii. Warehouse receipts must be freely transferable by delivery and endorsement; 
iv. The holder of a warehouse receipt must be first in line to receive the stored goods or 
their fungible equivalent on liquidation or default of the warehouse; 
v. The prospective recipient of a warehouse receipt should be able to determine, before 
acceptance, if there is a competing claim on the collateral underlying the receipt. The 
lack of an appropriate legal environment is probably the single most important 
constraint on the creation and acceptance of warehouse receipts in many developing 
countries and in most countries in transition. 
 
b) Operational conditions  
The operational conditions must be conducive to the creation of a warehouse receipt 
system and include the following: 
i. Reliable warehouse certification, guaranteeing basic physical and financial 
standards; 
ii. Operate on a large scale: The cost of warehouse receipt administration and 
oversight decreases with scale. The more warehouses available, the lower the cost 
of monitoring the system. 
iii. The existence of independent determination and verification of the quantity and 
the quality of stored commodities, based on a national grading system (with 
inspection of warehouses and stored commodities performed, in most cases, by 
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the private sector under license from a government body-for agricultural goods, 
usually the ministry of agriculture); and 
iv. The availability of property and casualty insurance: The integrity of the system 
must be assured through performance guarantees. A key prerequisite for the 
acceptability of warehouse receipts by the trade and by banks is the existence of a 
performance guarantees for warehouses, assuring that the quantities of goods 
stored match those specified by the warehouse receipt and that their quality is the 
same as, or better than, that stated on the receipt. Without this guarantee, farmers 
and traders will be reluctant to store their crops, and banks will be hesitant to 
accept warehouse receipts as secure collateral for financing agricultural 
inventories. 
 
2.6 Warehouse Receipt System in Malawi 
 
Warehouse Receipt System is mainly operated by the two Commodity Exchanges in 
Malawi, namely, the Agriculture Commodity Exchange for Africa (ACE) and AHL 
Commodities Exchange (AHCX). 
 
ACE, was established in 2005 and started operating an online trading platform in October 
2006. The National Small Farmers‟ Association of Malawi (NASFAM) took the 
initiative to establish ACE as an attempt to ease the marketing effort for small farmers 
with the financial support from the USAID. The aim was to link national marketing 
institutions to create free information flows and facilitate regional trade growth. Shortly 
after launching, it had attracted the interest of 11 companies in Malawi, 6 companies in 
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Zimbabwe and a growing number of members from South Africa, who are also members 
of the SAFEX (AMPRIP Trade Forum 2007). 
 
2.6.1 Auction Holdings Commodities Exchange 
 
AHCX is an initiative by Auction Holding Limited (AHL), Malawi’s largest tobacco 
company, which is partly owned by the government. The roll out of AHCX began in 
2013 with the first trading session conducted on 16th May 2013. A total of 30 tons were 
transacted on the first three separate trades. The initial days saw major trading in 
groundnuts, soybeans and pigeon peas (AHCX 2014). 
 
AHCX has broader than usual scope of operations which include: 
i. Quality assessment and certification 
ii. Electronic Warehouse Receipting (Collateral Management) 
iii. Trading floor operations 
iv. Clearing and settlement 
v. Market information dissemination 
 
In 2015/2016 season AHCX rolled out forward contracts targeting soybeans and pigeon 
peas. AHCX entered into an agreement with processors to procure the commodities 
through the exchange on forward contracts basis. The buyers were required to 
successfully commit to the contract including its condition of price mode, payment mode 




Members of the exchange and the public at large were invited to express their interest to 
supply on the forward contracts. The interested suppliers were required to provide a 5% 
performance bond to AHCX before the forward contract is signed. At maturity date, the 
suppliers were required to deliver on the contract and payment was being made 24 hours 
after the delivery time (AHCX 2015). 
 
However, the forward contracts were not successful because it didn’t attract many 
suppliers due to the required performance bond of 5%. Since AHCX entered into 
agreement with buyers, it was deemed as a default on the contract; and AHCX was 
dragged to court and was ordered to pay MK 2 billion which is equivalent to USD 2.7 
million (The Nation 2016) 
 
2.6.2 Agriculture Commodity exchange for Africa (ACE) 
 
ACE commenced operations as a virtual commodity exchange in 2006 with the National 
Small Farmers Association of Malawi as a founding member and shareholder. ACE has a 
system whereby bids and offers are advertised on a screen. When a deal is struck between 
two parties it is supposed to be a valid forward contract. However, when the market price 
moves away from the transaction price, a culture has unfortunately established itself 
where the party losing out because she/he can now obtain a higher/lower price, walks 
away from the transaction. Apparently this is no different from any other transaction 
struck outside the exchange, but nonetheless it greatly tarnishes the image of the 





(Kennedy 2011) confirms this view in his analysis stating two criteria that hampered 
growth: A reputation was difficult to achieve due to contractual defaults (usually on the 
side of the seller) and the provision of realistic market information based upon trades 
agreed through use of the exchange was hampered by a lack of exchange trade volume. 
 
Since 2011, registered warehouse operators have been able to take grain deposits from 
third parties and issue a WR as proof of grain stored in the name of the owner. The WR 
could then be offered on the ACE trading platform. 
 
ACE has advocated for a WRS as an integral part of agricultural trade and financing 
since its incorporation in 2006. The system was aimed at reducing the risk of 
contract/performance defaults in agricultural trade and also facilitate competitive 
financing with agricultural commodities as collateral. Before the enactment of the 
Warehouse Receipt Bill, the system was built on a contractual relationship between 
depositors, storage operators, financial institutions and ACE. The initial success of the 
WRS was very much dependent on the active involvement of all participants and this is 
why it took 6 years before the first WR was issued, financed and traded in Malawi (ACE, 
2012). 
 
2.6.2.1 ACE Progress report 
 
In 2011, ACE registered the GSL silos in Kanengo, Lilongwe as the first WRS storage 
facility (ACE 2012). The GSL facility has a capacity of 12,000 MT and it was open to 
26 
 
deposits from any interested third party. In 2011, three small rural warehouses of 500 
tons each were registered. A fourth warehouse with a capacity of 2000 tons was under 
consideration in an arrangement with the UNDP Millennium Villages Project. It would 
have operated under the banner of NASFAM, assisted and supervised by ACE, for the 
balance of the 2011 season (ACE 2011). 
Storage fees were set by GSL and advertised by ACE. The fees cover all costs and the 
depositor will have no additional costs. This includes bagging in new bags and printing 
these bags where WFP is the buyer (ACE 2012). 
 
The National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) plays a very important part when it comes 
to maize storage and marketing in Malawi. The NFRA came about in 1998 when the 
government, under pressure of the IMF and World Bank programs, agreed to eliminate 
price support operations for maize by ADMARC and prepare it to operate on a strictly 
commercial basis. It agreed to establish an agency to handle disaster relief involving the 
management of the strategic grain reserve in the place of ADMARC, with a clear 
delineation of responsibilities between the two agencies. 
 
The NFRA had for some years taken deposits from selected large traders, and 
occasionally the banks called the NFRA to obtain confirmation of physical stock before 
approving finance (ACE, 2012). This was, in effect, an unstructured warehouse receipt. 
The NFRA was quick to confirm that they would participate in the WRS and issue WRs 
from their Kanengo (Lilongwe) silos. NFRA has storage sites in other locations and also 
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confirmed that they will apply the procedures that have been implemented and tested in 
Kanengo. 
 
Other than the NFRA warehouses, ACE has targeted a total 16 facilities with a combined 
storage capacity of 53,200 tons (ACE, 2012). During May 2012, ACE sent its inspectors 
to the warehouse owners (listed below), responding to their application based on the new 
proposed requirements: 
I. Rab Processors Lilongwe 
II. Rab Processors Blantyre 
III. Farmers World Lilongwe 
IV. Agora Blantyre 
V. KU Distributors Blantyre 
VI. Transglobe Blantyre 
VII. Rice Milling Blantyre 
 
Individual feedback is still confidential, but it could be reported that four sites were 
unconditionally approved, one conditionally and two declined (ACE 2012). It is 
considered a good mix, proving the point that inspections are thorough and that in some 
instances grain has been stored in facilities that are not up to standard. ACE certification 
will most definitely improve the industry standard. Informed market participants will not 
be confident if they know that they store product at a facility that is substandard 





2.6.3 Summarized extract of the process for issuing and redeeming a WR 
 
The process of depositing the product, issuing the warehouse certificate, financing and 
redeeming the certificate, can be summarized as follows (ACE 2012): 
 A commodity is deposited in an ACE registered warehouse facility, certified to 
store that commodity. 
 The warehouse owner issues a WR, through ACE, and thereby guarantees the 
quantity and quality. 
 The WR owner could request financing from a preferred bank and immediately 
receive the funds. 
 The WR owner follows the market prices and may offer the WR for sale through 
ACE‟s trading platform. 
 A buyer accepts the offer and ACE generates a contract. 
 The buyer deposits funds into the ACE settlement account. 
 ACE settles the finance and storage costs and transfers ownership of the WR 
 ACE transfers the balance to the seller 
 The new owner can either collect the commodity or request new financing from a 
preferred bank. 
 The WR is cancelled in the Registry if the commodity is collected. If not, the 





2.6.4 Warehouse Receipts Bill 
 
The warehouse receipt bill in Malawi was drafted in 2016 and gazetted in 2017.  The Bill 
defines and clarifies the legal status of warehouse receipts as documents of title and to 
clarifies the rights and obligations of warehouse operators and holders of warehouse 
receipts in accordance with international best practices in order to facilitate trade and 
financing of goods in storage in Malawi. The Bill is divided into the following six Parts 
(Jere and Nyirongo 2016): 
 
Part I: Contains preliminary provisions including interpretation of terms used throughout 
the Bill. A warehouse receipt is defined as a document of title issued by a warehouse 
operator for goods in storage. 
 
Part II: Makes provision for the issuance and form of warehouse receipts. A warehouse 
receipt may be issued by any warehouse operator and need not be in any particular 
format. The Part makes provision for, at a minimum, the information to be indicated in a 
warehouse receipt. A warehouse receipt may be issued in either an electronic or paper 
form. A warehouse receipt may either be negotiable or non-negotiable. The Part also 
makes provision for the control of warehouse receipts. A warehouse receipt may be 
reissued in an alternative medium on request. 
 
Part III: Makes provision for the rights and obligations of warehouse operators. 
Generally, warehouse operators are to exercise due care in the storage and handling of 
goods in storage and to redeliver the goods on demand or upon termination of an 
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underlying storage agreement. Goods covered by warehouse receipt shall be kept separate 
and identifiable or may be comingled if fungible. A warehouse operator may terminate 
storage prior to the termination of a storage agreement in some circumstances after giving 
notice to a person with interest in the stored goods. A warehouse operator shall have lien 
on goods covered by a warehouse receipt including charges for storage, transportation, 
insurance etc. A warehouse operator may enforce his lien in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the Bill. 
 
Part IV: Describes the formal requirements for and legal effect of negotiation and 
transfer of warehouse receipts. Upon due negotiation, a purchaser or pledgee of goods 
covered by a negotiable warehouse receipt shall acquire title to the document and the 
goods covered by the document that is superior to all other claimants, with the sole 
practical exception of goods placed in the warehouse by a thief. Upon negotiation other 
than due negotiation or transfer of a warehouse receipt, a purchaser or pledgee shall 
acquire all rights that a seller or pledger had the legal capacity to transfer. Upon delivery 
of goods, a warehouse operator is required to cancel a negotiable warehouse receipt or, if 
the warehouse receipt is lost or stolen, to remain liable to any holder who in good faith 
obtains the lost or stolen document for value. 
 
Part V: Clarifies the relation of rights and priorities as between secured parties under the 




Part VI: Makes provision for miscellaneous matters including procedures to be followed 
for the protection of warehouse operators in the case of lost or stolen documents, 
resolution of conflicting claims to the goods in storage, and the power of courts to compel 
delivery of goods covered by outstanding negotiable warehouse receipts. 
 
2.7 Empirical Studies 
Nyirenda (2010) conducted a study on the role transaction costs and marketing 
cooperatives play in small scale farmers marketing of rice in the Bwanje valley area in 
Malawi. In order to achieve this, the study researched if small scale farmers consider 
transaction costs when making the decision to participate in a cooperative. The study was 
also aimed at finding out if there is any association between cooperative membership and 
some dimensions of a transaction that affect the cost of transacting as well as the role 
cooperative membership has on the incomes the farmers earn from rice. A number of 
areas were discovered to be the major sources of transaction costs for the farmers in the 
study area. These sources include limited access to market information (about prices, 
markets and buyers) which hindered the farmers’ capability to make informed sales 
decisions, poor road infrastructure which limits the farmers access to markets as well as 
buyers’ access to the farmers, and availability of few buyers in the area which increased 
the cost of negotiation for the farmers since they were negotiating in less competitive 
marketing environments. These factors affected the cost of transaction for the farmers 
through search costs and negotiation costs. The results found that three of the transaction 
cost variables had a significant influence on the choice decision to participate in the 
cooperative. The significant variables were type of buyer, information on prices and 
membership status of the farmer. 
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Studies have also been conducted on the impacts of Commodity Exchanges as MSI. One 
of them is the study on the South African exchange (SAFEX) by Moholwa and Phukubje 
(2016) which used a nine-years dataset to test price discovery for wheat and sunflower 
seeds on the SAFEX. The study presented two sets of results. First, it showed that there is 
a significant relationship between spot and future prices, implying improved price 
discovery due to the exchange. Given that SAFEX has profitably existed for more than a 
quarter of a century without any support, this result is to be expected. Traders and 
farmers voluntarily traded their commodities through SAFEX because it benefitted them 
by reducing their transactions costs, which in turn improved market performance. 
However, the study also reported that brokerage fees can make trade unprofitable. 
 
Rashid (2015) added that Improved price discovery itself implies that the problems of 
incomplete information, high transactions costs, and other market failures are being 
addressed.  On the other hand, Warehouse Receipts Systems, as an integral part of most 
commodity exchanges, have contributed to increased liquidity in the markets, which is 
reflected by the trade volumes in successful exchanges. 
 
However, very limited success is observed in developing countries, where agricultural 
markets are plagued by market failures. Clearly, one explanation is the absence of key 
viability conditions. In order to have Western-style exchanges, all viability conditions 
need to be improved. However, for most developing countries, addressing those viability 
conditions would take time.  Therefore, an alternative strategy would be to try out new 
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institutional and operational designs instead of replicating the designs of industrialized 
countries (Rashid 2015). 
 
This thesis therefore proposes an operational design of hybridizing forward contracts and 
warehouse receipt system in a commodity exchange set up in a quest to address the 
agricultural commodities’ market failures.   
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1 Governance Mechanism of Forward Contracts and WRS in Malawi 
 
The research used descriptive-qualitative data in an attempt to describe the ideal 
conceptual frameworks supporting warehouse receipt system and contracts and compare 
them with the case of Malawi. The description focused on institutional arrangement and 
legal and regulatory framework governing forward contracts and warehouse receipt 
system.  
3.2 Transaction Costs and decisions in Forward Contracts 
 
3.2.1 Approach, techniques, and tools for data analysis 
 
This research simulated a decision tree indicating the decision to enter into a forward 
contracts or not based on transaction costs under different scenarios i.e. with and 
without the Marketing Supporting Institutions (MSI) e.g. the commodity exchange. 
The research also simulated the likelihood of default or no default on forward 
contracts based on transaction costs (switching costs) under the two different 
scenarios (with and without MSI). The main transaction costs and their proxies are 
as follows: 
 
a. Information search  
- Knowledge of prices in the other markets 
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- Knowledge of available buyers/sellers  
 
b. Contract enforcement  
- Monitoring  
- Quality and quantity uncertainty 
 
The above mentioned proxies of transaction costs are difficult to measure 
quantitatively. With this in mind, the goal of the test was to qualitatively rank the 
magnitude of each proxy as high or low and associate it to the probability of entering 
a forward contract and default under alternative options. The basis of association is 
as follows: 1) Where the transaction cost to participate in forward contract is high, 
people will avoid to participate in it, 2) Where the switching costs for a reneging 




The research used descriptive-qualitative data sourced from both published and 
unpublished literature and the general understanding of the reality on the ground 
regarding access to price information, information on buyers, quality and quantity 









       The following data were used to conduct the cost benefit analysis: 
a) Average monthly prices of soybeans for 10 years starting from 2007 to 2017. 
Soybeans has been chosen because it is the second most volatile commodity 
traded on commodity exchanges in Malawi. The first most volatile is maize 
but it is as a result of government interventions through subsidies and price 
support mechanism which to a large extent are inefficient. Average monthly 
prices of soybeans will be obtained from FAO website and commodity 
exchanges. 
b) Costs associated with warehouse receipt system was collected from the 
commodity exchanges. The costs include storage cost, handling, quality 
certification and trading commission.  
 
3.3.2 Approach, techniques, and tools for data analysis 
 
a) Time taken (in months) to reach maximum price within six months of the 
trading season for each year was determined. Average percentage price 
increase to reach maximum price and average time taken (in months) to reach 
maximum price across the period under study were calculated and used as 
standard percentage price increase and the storage period.  
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b) WRS costs on a per ton basis were calculated for the period taken to reach the 
maximum price. 
c) Economic benefits of WRS were calculated by simulating the price gain and 
subtracting WRS costs for the assumed period.  
d) Sensitivity analysis was conducted using Monte Carlo Simulation to assess the 
effect of change in future prices on the economic benefits of WRS.   
 3.4 Hybridizing forward contracts and WRS 
 
3.4.1 Approach and techniques 
 
a) The research designed a model that accommodates both forward contracts and 
WRS as a hybrid risk management tool by changing specific operational 
conditions. An  illustrative diagrams were used to show the flow of 
commodity, documents and funds among the parties involved. 
 
b)  The research also simulated a mathematical example of the hybrid risk 
management tool and show how it adderesses the challenges faced by WRS 







CHAPTER IV:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1 Governance Mechanism of Forward Contracts in Malawi 
 
Forward contracts in Malawi are usually private transaction and they are not regulated. In 
light of this, it is very difficult to follow and document forward contract transactions. 
ACE introduced a system in 2016 to make forward contract transactions transparent. The 
system allowed buyers and sellers to bid through ACE and deals could be struck as valid 
forward contracts. However, the system lacked contract enforcement mechanism because 
when the market price moves away from the transaction price, a culture was 
unfortunately established where the party losing out because she/he is getting a 
higher/lower price walk away from the transaction. Apparently this was no different from 
any other transaction struck outside the exchange. However, the Malawi penal code 
reprimands breach of contract but in many circumstances such cases are taken to court if 
parties involved are high profile and not ordinary farmers. 
AHCX also tried to introduce forward contract transaction in 2015. AHCX’s approach 
was aimed at enhancing contract enforcement by way of demanding performance bond of 
5% of the value of the contract from both the supplier and buyer. This was not successful 
because many suppliers/farmers could not afford to pay the performance bond upfront. 
Both Exchanges are no longer coordinating forward contract transactions and currently 





4.2 Transaction Costs and decisions in Forward Contracts 
 
All transactions have embedded costs (Coase, 1937) and called these costs transaction 
costs (TC). They are present whenever there is uncertainty or incomplete information.   
TC include the costs of information collection and asymmetry, negotiation, monitoring, 
co-ordination and enforcement of contracts. He explains that firms emerge to economize 
on the transaction costs of market exchanges and that the extent of vertical integration 
will depend on the magnitude of the transaction costs.  
 
Grief (2008) argues that markets only function in the presence of an adequate 
institutional environment. The Institutional environment involves formal and informal 
rules that private trading partners have to comply with and that constrain but also 
facilitate exchange relationships. Market-supporting institutions ensure that contracts are 
enforced, property rights are respected, opportunistic behavior by trading partners is 
diminished, the adverse effects of externalities are reduced, information flows improve, 
transaction costs are reduced, and tools for risk management are provided. 
 
Based on the literature review and the case of ACE and AHCX, the TCs and the 
decisions in forward contracts can be summarized in the decision tree below (Figure 4.1).
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Grief (2018) discusses establishing market-supporting institutions (MSI) for contract 
enforcement. Designed MSI for contract enforcement are intentionally created 
organizations that are based on more formalized rules like ACE and AHCX. These rules 
and their enforcement organizations increase the disciplinary impact of economic 
sanctions by changing the information structure, providing coordination and by altering 
the strategic interaction among economic agents. With such market-supporting 
institutions, coordination of exchange in the market incur lower TC in terms of 
information search, negotiation, monitoring, co-ordination and enforcement of contracts. 
 
In the case of ACE, the system was aimed at reducing the TC for price information and 
contract negotiation, hence, Forward Contract (FC) deals were easily struck. However, 
the system did not emphasize on contract enforcement  and it provided a leeway  for 
opportunistic behavior. As a result, the switching cost was low for the contracted parties 
and the forward contracts were not enforced.  
 
In the case AHCX, the system was aimed at reducing the TCs for price information and 
contract negotiation. The system also emphasized on contract enforcement by way of 
demanding a 5 percent performance bond from both parties. This proved to be a high 
transaction cost for enforcing contracts as only few suppliers managed to pay the 
performance bond and a majority did not qualify for the contracts. Due to low 




Without MSI, coordination of exchange in the market incurs substantial transaction costs 
as exchange partners have to safeguard themselves against opportunistic behavior and 
spend time and effort in finding suitable trading partners, negotiating the terms of 
exchange, overcoming information asymmetries, monitoring and enforcing agreements.  
However, contract enforcement is most likely to occur in cases where agents value the 
prospect of continued exchange and the enforcement device in such situations is often 
based on reputation effects. The potentially negative effect on an agent’s reputation deters 
contract breach and such reputation-based deterrence for contract breach is stronger in 
multilateral reputation mechanisms than in bilateral relationships. In Malawian setting, 
this is applicable where farmers operate as an organization e.g. club, cooperative or 
association. As it stands, Malawi lacks a designed model that offers an efficient forward 
contracting mechanism with both low transaction costs and enhanced contract 
enforcement.   
 
4.3 Governance and Operational Mechanism of WRS in Malawi 
 
According to Bass and Henderson (2000), lessons learned from the experience in Ghana, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and other African countries in implementing a successful 
warehouse receipt program can be grouped into two: 
 
i. Appropriate regulation and supervision of operations: 
The legal system must support pledge instruments, such as warehouse receipts, as 
secure collateral. The warehouse receipt bill in Malawi was drafted in 2016 and 
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gazetted in 2017.  The Bill defines and clarifies the legal status of warehouse receipts 
as documents of title and clarifies the rights and obligations of warehouse operators 
and holders of warehouse receipts in accordance with international best practices in 
order to facilitate trade and financing of goods in storage in Malawi.  
 
ii. Operational conditions  
The operational conditions must be conducive to the creation of a warehouse receipt 
system and include the following: 
 
a. Reliable warehouse certification: ACE certifies third party warehouse operators 
who intend to operate the WRS under ACE. Apart from third party warehouses, 
ACE also operates its own rural warehouses. AHCX also operates its own leased 
warehouses, hence, guaranteeing basic physical and financial standards. 
 
a. Operate on a large scale: ACE operates 19 warehouses representing 88,574 tons 
of storage space available for deposits. From this, ACE operates 11 rural 
warehouses owned by partner farmer associations or private sector partners; 
cumulatively offer depositors access to 6,500 tons. AHCX operates 13 
warehouses only across Malawi with total storage capacity of 22,350 tons. With 
this information, it is clear that warehouses are most commonly located in 
commercial areas and are relatively scarce in up-country locations where most 
producers are located. The status quo would increase transportation costs because 
most warehouses operating under WRS are not close to producers. Very few users 
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would be willing to have their crop inventory stored too far away from their 
production site.  
 
b. The existence of independent determination and verification of the quantity and 
the quality of stored commodities: Currently Malawi doesn’t have a harmonized 
National grading standard. ACE and AHCX have fragmented grading standards in 
grain and oilseeds. This possess a challenge when engaging in international trade. 
However, a proposal for the development of national grading standard is at an 
advance stage with the support of USAID’s Trade Hub. Quantity verification is 
usually done by the commodity exchanges.  
 
c. The availability of performance guarantees: A key prerequisite for the 
acceptability of warehouse receipts by the trader and by banks is the existence of 
a performance guarantees for warehouses, assuring that the quantities of goods 
stored match those specified by the warehouse receipt and that their quality is the 
same as, or better than, that stated on the receipt. Warehouses under ACE and 
AHCX operations are always insured and warehouse operators take responsibility 
for any significant deviation in quantity and quality. 
 
4.4 Cost-Benefit analysis of WRS 
 




WRS comes at a cost and Table 4.1 below shows the charges of WRS incurred by the 
depositors from commodity deposit to commodity trade. 
Table 4.1 : Charges for WRS for the Commodity Exchanges in Malawi 
Cost item  Cost per ton (MWK) 
Handling 5,000 per ton 
Storage cost 30/ton/day 
Trading Commission 2% of sales 
 
Commodity handling involves loading, unloading and quality check. Storage cost is 
charged on a per day basis and trading commission is charged on sales.  
The WR can also be used as a financial instrument i.e. it gives an opportunity to the 
commodity depositor to access financing from banks and the cost of WRF are 
summarized in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.1 :Charges for WRF in Malawi 
Cost item                     Percent  
Hair cut  70% 
Arrangement fee 1% 
Interest rate per annum 21% 
 
When providing warehouse receipt financing, banks usually discount the value of the 
warehouse receipt (hair cut) to 70 percent to cushion themselves against price shocks. 
Banks charge an arrangement fee of 1 percent on the loan amount and interest charge is 
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currently at 21 percent per annum. 
 
4.4.2 Price Movement of Soybeans  
 
WRS allows the farmers to avoid selling their crop immediately after harvest when the 
supply of the commodity is usually highest and therefore prices lowest. The expectation 
is that with time the supply goes down, prices increase and market information becomes 
clear. 
 
Table 4.3 below provides the price trend of soybeans from harvest period in April up to 
the sixth month of the trading season within a time period of 10 years starting from 2007 
to 2017. Prices are quoted in Malawi kwacha per kilogram. 
Table 4.2: Price trend of soybeans in Malawian Kwacha per kilogram  
  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  Avg. 
  APR 72.88 85.42 120.00 128.07 127.42 200.70 200.65 150.00 161.75 316.00 190.00   
 MAY 71.04 96.23 132.69 108.98 126.87 192.34 215.46 157.00 166.16 326.00 130.00   
 JUN 73.38 109.95 133.76 133.76 133.76 135.70 224.68 226.00 191.40 339.00 145.00   
 JULY 64.48 113.49 124.49 121.60 133.30 213.05 242.27 240.00 201.59 349.00 165.00   
 AUG 72.44 126.38 131.12 119.02 137.69 141.99 233.03 246.00 205.18 358.00 190.00   
 SEPT 66.82 122.69 125.46 132.83 136.96 223.82 241.22 249.00 210.82 360.00 195.00   
Time taken to 
reach 
maximum 
price(Months) 3 5 3 6 5 6 4 6 6 6 6 5 
Price increase 
to reach 
Maximum(%) 1% 48% 11% 4% 8% 12% 21% 0.66 0.30 0.14 0.03 20% 
Price increase 
after 5 
months(%) -1% 48% 9% -7% 8% -29% 16% 64% 27% 13% 0%   
 
 From the table above, it takes five months on average for prices of soybeans to reach 
their maximum, ceteris paribus; and on average prices increase by 20 percent from the 




4.4.3 Cost-Return structure of Warehouse Receipt System 
 
Based on the cost of WRS and the price trend of soybeans provided above, the cost-return 
structure of WRS for soybeans for a period of 5 months is simulated in the Table 4.3 
below. 
Table 4.3: Cost-Return Structure of WRS 
 Description MWK 
Price at deposit  MWK per ton     200,000.00  
Selling price after 5 months  20% Increase      240,000.00  
Price gain per ton          40,000.00  
   
Costs of WRS   
Handling 5000 per ton          5,000.00  
Storage cost 30/ton/day          4,500.00  
Trade Commission 2% of sales          4,800.00  
Total WRS cost MWK per ton for 5 
months 
       14,300.00  
Net Benefit to the farmer MWK per ton        25,700.00  
Net Benefit to the farmer(%) % of price gain 64.25% 
Return on WRS  179.7% 
 
Assuming a farmer deposits 1 ton of soybeans in April and the spot market price is MWK 
200,000 per ton. If the commodity is stored for five months and  price in Month 5 is up 
20% from the harvest price of MWK200,000, then the take price at sale is MWK240,000.  
If the farmer decides to sell at this price, then the farmer incurs MWK 14,300 as WRS 
cost.  From the price gain of MWK 40,000 within five months, the farmer nets MWK 
25,700, equivalent to 64.25% of the price gain. The base benefit from the farmers having 
access to the WRS is equivalent to 12.85%.  That is, the contribution of the WRS to farm 
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income as a result of not selling at harvest price. The return on using the WRS is 179.7% 
[Net Price Gain ÷ WRS Cost].  
Let us assume the farmer self stores the grain to avoid paying the external cost.  We also 
assume, for simplicity, that there is not pecuniary cost to the farmer for self storage.  The 
farmer who uses the WRS has a secondary benefit over the one using self storage because 
the former can use WR as a collateral to procure funding prior to sale of commodity.  
Suppose the maximum amount that may be borrowed using a WR as collateral is 70% of 
the commodity value at harvest.  Also, assume that the financial institution charges a 1% 
facilitation fee and a 21% per annum interest rate on borrowed funds.  Finally, assume 
the comparative borrowing cost without a the WR collateral is 1.5% facilitation fee and 
28% interest rate.  The foregoing implies that borrowing cost with the WR collateral is 
MWK 13,650 [MWK 140,000 *( 1% + (21% * 5/12))] compared to MWK  18,433.33 
[MWK 140,000 * (1.5% + (28% * 5/12)] for an uncollateralized facility of the same 
amount over the same period.  The net benefit from the WRS from the loan facility 
opportunity is MWK 4,783.33 [MWK 18,433.33 – MWK 13,650].  This brings the total 
benefit from the WRS (when the farmer exercises the option to borrow using the WR as a 
collateral) to MWK 30,483.33.  The equivalent return on the WRS is, thus, 213.17% 
[(Net Gain from WRF + Net Price Gain) ÷ WRS Cost].   
 
4.4.4 Sensitivity analysis on cost-return structure of WRS 
 
WRS does not hedge against price volatility. The expectation of the commodity depositor 
is that the price will go up.  However, there is a possibility that prices may go down or 
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may not increase as expected depending on forces of demand and supply. Figure 4.2 
below shows the change in the price of soybeans after one through five months from the 
start the trading season between 2007 and 2017.  The figure shows significant variability 
in price changes between harvest and sellinig price by month of sale and year.  For 
example, selling in May, i.e., after a month of storage, shows about 45.5% probability 
over the 11 years of getting a negative price movement, averaging -10.7%. The average 
positive price movement for selling in May was estimated at 6.9% over the 11 years. The 
probability of a negative price change selling in June is 18.2% compared to 27.3% for 
selling in July or August.  The average negative price movement between harvest and 
June is -28.0% compared to positive price movement of 15.4%. For July and August, the 
average negative price movements are respectively -9.9% and -12.3% and average 
positive price movements are 20.4% and 26.5%.  The probability of a negative price 
movement when sold in September was estimated at 9.1%, with negative average price 
movement of -8.3% and positive average price movement of 20.4% over the 11 years.  
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Figure 4.2: Percent Change in Harvest Price by Month of Sale (2007-2017) 
 
We used a Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the potential net price for farmers using the 
WRS compared to those who are not and, therefore, selling at harvest.  We used the range 
of price changes for each of the sale months estimated above to randomly generate 1,000 
price changes and then simulated them 25 times for each sale month – i.e., May through 
September.  We kept harvest price at MWK 200,000 throughout the simulations.  Figure 
4.3 shows the average results from the 25 simulated outcomes.  The figure shows that 
selling in the second month produces an average loss of MWK 29,166/tonne over the 11 
years.  On the other hand, selling in September produces an average gain of MWK 
58,367/tonne for farmers using the WRS compared to those who are selling at harvest. 
The simulated results suggest that given the conditions seen over the past 11 years, 
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Figure 4.3: Net Grain Revenue per Tonne for Farmers Using the Warehouse Receipt 
System Compared to Those Selling at Harvest  
 
From the analysis above, it is clear that the benefits of WRS to farmer depends on how 
well the price moves from the time of deposit to the time the commodity is sold; such that 
it should be able to cover the cost of warehouse receipt system and provide a margin to the 
farmer. 
 
4.5 Hybridizing forward contracts and WRS 
 
The analysis done on both forward contracts and warehouse receipt system shows  that 
these risk management tools complement each other in addressing the uncertainty peculiar 
to each risk management tool. WRS provides a guarantee on the availability of the 



































On the other hand, WRS does not guarantee the exact forward price which forward 
contracts provide. 
 Figure 4.4 below shows the proposed model of hybridizing forward contracts and WRS in 






























Initiating Forward contract      Flow of commodity     Flow of WR                Flow of funds      
 
1. Initiating forward contracts 
 
Commodity Exchange Advertises forward prices in various media outlets. Forward prices 
to be based on the current price plus cost of warehouse receipt system plus a margin. The 
negotiating variable will be the margin because the current price and the cost of WRS are 
always given. Sellers and buyers will be required to make offers to sell and buy 
Commodity Exchange 
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respectively. When a deal is struck between two parties, it is presented as a forward 
contract and the Commodity Exchange becomes the caretaker of the contract. 
2. Depositing the commodity and performance bond  
For the forward contract to be valid, the farmer or supplier will be required to deposit the 
commodity under warehouse receipt system and the buyer will be required to deposit a 
performance bond committing to buy the commodity. The depositor will not be required 
to pay WRS charges upfront up until the commodity is sold. Ideally, the performance bond 
should be designed to cover the handling and storage cost and should be expressed as a 
percentage of the forward price. In a situation where the buyer for some other reasons 
decided not to honor the contract, the deposited performance bond would go towards 
paying for the storage and handling cost. But if the buyer honors the contract at maturity, 
the performance bond will go towards payment for the forward price and the buyer will 
only be required to pay the difference. The deposited performance bond can be invested 
in the money market and the net interest received would also go towards the forward price 
payment.    
3. Warehouse Receipting 
The warehouse owner issues a WR, through the Exchange, and thereby guarantees the 
quantity and quality. The WR will be required to indicate the forward contract position.    
4. Warehouse Receipt Financing 
The WR owner could request financing from a preferred bank and receive the funds to 
meet immediate needs. 
5. Maturity of the forward contract 
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At maturity of the contract, the buyer deposits funds into the Exchange settlement 
account. The deposited funds plus the performance bond deposited at the start of the 
contract settles the forward contract price. Subsequently, the funds settle the finance 
owed to the bank (if used), storage costs and handling cost, and trading commission less 
any money market returns. 
6. Take home for the depositor and buyer   
The exchange transfers ownership of the WR to the buyer and transfers cash balance to 
the seller. 
7.  Release of the commodity 
The buyer collects the commodity from the warehouse Operator 
 
4.5.1 Mathematical Example of the Hybrid Risk Management Tool  
 
Table 4.5 below shows a mathematical simulation of the hybrid of forward contract and WRS.  
The scenario assumes the current price of MK 200,000 per tonne  and the buyer and seller agree 
through the exchange to buy and sell after 3 months at predetermined price.
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 Table 4.4: Mathematical hybrid model of forward contract and WRS 
  Description Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 
Spot Market Price (A) MWK per ton 200,000.00   
Costs of WRS     
Handling (B) MWK 5000 per ton 5,000.00   
Storage cost (C.) MWK30/ton/day 900.00 900.00 900.00 
Total WRS cost (B+C) MWK per ton  5,900.00 6,800.00 7,700.00 
Price before Margin(A+B+C)  205,900.00 206,800.00 207,700.00 
Margin(D) % 10% 10% 10% 
Margin(D*(A+B+C)) MWK per ton  20,590 20,680 20,770 
Price before Commission (D*(A+B+C))+(A+B+C)  226,490.00 227,480.00 228,470.00 
Trading Commission (E.) 2% 4,529.80 4,549.60 4,569.40 
Forward Price at the end of the month F=((D*(A+B+C))+(A+B+C)+E) 231,019.80 232,029.60 233,039.40 
Price gain  to the farmer after WRS cost(F-E-C-B-A)     20,770 
Buyer's Payment     
Performance bond deposit WRS cost as % of 
forward price 
  3% 
Performance bond deposit MWK per ton - - 7,700.00 
Interest from performance bond deposit 18% p.a. (money market 
rate) 
115.50 231.00 346.50 
VAT on interest  16.50% 19.06 38.12 57.17 
Net Interest from performance bond deposit  96.44 192.89 289.33 
Buyer’s Payment at maturity     225,050.07 
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The model above simulates a case where the seller negotiates a forward price that gives a 
margin of 10% of the current price and the cost of WRS excluding the trading 
commission. The forward price is then determined by adding the current price with the 
WRS cost for three months, the agreed margin and the trading commission. In this case, 
at a current price of MK 200,000 per ton, the forward price after 3 months is MK 
233,039.40. From this price the farmer gains MK 20,562.30 per ton after deducting the 
cost of WRS. 
When initiating the contract, the buyer will be required to deposit a performance bond of 
3% of the forward price which is derived by dividing the cost of commodity handling and 
storage with the forward price which translated to MK 7,700 per ton. If this performance 
bond is invested in the money market at an interest rate of 18% per annum, within a 
period of 3 months the investment will attract interest of MK346.50. Net interest after tax 
of 16.5% is MK289.33. At the end of 3 months the deposited performance bond will 
increase to MK 7,989.33. At maturity of the contract, the buyer will only be required to 
pay MK 225,050.07 as a balance for the forward price of MK 233,039.40. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 Conclusion  
 
The research has revealed that Malawi lacks a designed model that offers an efficient forward 
contracting mechanism with both low transaction costs and enhanced contract enforcement.  
ACE introduced a system in 2016 to make forward contract transactions transparent and 
reduce transaction costs for information search and contract negotiations. However, the 
system lacked contract enforcement mechanism, hence, it wasn’t successful. AHCX also tried 
to introduce forward contract transaction in 2015. AHCX’s approach was aimed at enhancing 
contract enforcement by way of demanding performance bond of 5% of the value of the 
contract from both the supplier and buyer. This was not successful because many 
suppliers/farmers could not afford to pay the performance bond upfront. Both Exchanges are 
no longer coordinating forward contract transactions and currently forward contracts continue 
to be transacted out of the exchange albeit with challenges.    
 
The research has also indicated  that Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) avoids some of the 
opportunism and enforcement challenges presented by forward contracts because it enables 
farmers to deposit their crop in the care of a warehouse operator and sell the crop when and 
where they choose. However,  the study has also shown that WRS incurs both upside and 
downside price movement which provides fluctuating net benefits to farmers depending on the 




The thesis explored the net benefits of developing a hybrid system that allow forward 
contracts with warehouse receipt enforcement mechanisms. Thus, farmers are guaranteed a 
minimum price at some future date and the deposited commodity is used as the security 
supporting the guaranteed minimum price. The buyer also deposits a performance bond as 
commitment to purchase the commodity. The mathematical model example has proved that 
the hybrid system guarantees a fixed margin to the farmer over and above the harvest price 
and WRS cost as opposed to fluctuating margins under WRS alone.  
 
The research has identified three factors that can lead to the successful implementation of this 
hybrid system in Malawi  and they include: the availability of the warehouse receipt bill which 
supports pledge instruments such as warehouse receipts as secure collateral; reliable 
warehouse certification which is done by AHCX and ACE on third party warehouse 
operators; and the availability of performance guarantee assuring that the quantities of goods 
stored match those specified by the warehouse receipt and that their quality is the same as, or 
better than, that stated on the receipt.  
 
The research has also identified two factors that can hinder  a successful implementation of 
the hybrid system and they include the following: First, low scale of warehousing operations 
under WRS. ACE operates 19 warehouses representing 88,574 tons of storage space available 
for deposits and only 11 of them representing 6,500 tons are rural warehouses. AHCX 
operates 13 warehouses across Malawi with total storage capacity of 22,350 tons. With this 
small scale of operations in rural areas, most farmers may not have a chance to benefit from 
this hybrid sytem; and the commodity exchanges may not benefit from the economies of scale 
60 
 
provided by large volumes of commodities produced in rural areas. Second, the absence of a 
harmonized national grading standard. ACE and AHCX have fragmented grading standards in 
grain and oilseeds. This possess a challenge when engaging in international trade because 




Take the system close to the producers 
In a well-developed WRS, warehouses are spread throughout the producing areas in 
reasonable proximity to producers. This proximity helps mitigate potentially high 
transportation costs; also, very few users would willing to have their crop inventory stored too 
far away from their production site. Currently in Malawi, warehouses are most commonly 
located in commercial areas and are relatively scarce in up-country locations. The scale of  
warehousing operations under this system can be increased in the rural areas through privately 
owned third party warehouses or development partners.  
 
Educating and selling the system to the stakeholders 
 
The concept of WRS is  new to many farmers and traders in Malawi as evidenced by low 
scale of operations which are also patchy across the country. It will be most beneficial to 
Commodity Exchanges to increase awareness campaign of the existence and benefits of this  
system so as to increase adoption rate. This would be a follow up activity after taking the 





National standardized grading regulations 
The commodity exchanges should push for the implementation of national standardized 
grading  regulations. This would will give confidence to international traders to take part in 
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